By Jennifer E. Sims, Burton Gerber
Choice makers matching wits with an adversary wish intelligence -- reliable, suitable details to assist them win. Intelligence can achieve those merits via directed learn and research, agile assortment, and the well timed use of guile and robbery. Counterintelligence is the paintings and perform of defeating those endeavors. Its function is equal to that of optimistic intelligence -- to realize virtue -- however it does so via exploiting, disrupting, denying, or manipulating the intelligence actions of others. The instruments of counterintelligence contain defense structures, deception, and cover: vaults, mirrors, and masks.In one imperative quantity, most sensible practitioners and students within the box clarify the significance of counterintelligence this day and discover the reasons of -- and sensible ideas for -- U.S. counterintelligence weaknesses. those specialists tension the significance of constructing a valid strategic imaginative and prescient in an effort to increase U.S. counterintelligence and emphasize the demanding situations posed by means of technological switch, careworn reasons, political tradition, and bureaucratic tension. Vaults, Mirrors, and mask skillfully finds that powerful counterintelligence is essential to making sure America's security.Published in cooperation with the guts for Peace and protection experiences and the George T. Kalaris Memorial Fund, Edmund A. Walsh institution of overseas provider, Georgetown collage.
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Extra resources for Vaults, Mirrors, and Masks: Rediscovering U.s. Counterintelligence
When he rode without a helmet, cars gave him a wide berth; when he wore a female wig, they gave him a still wider berth. 18 The counterintelligence lessons from Walker’s experiment are many, although in-depth analysis would require more data (such as whether the results would be the same in, say, Rome, Italy, or New York City). But these two lessons might be the most useful ones: lowering one’s own risks depends on knowing how a competitor will react to what you do; and the results of defensive measures may be counterintuitive and idiosyncratic.
Deciding which assets to defend requires analysis of which targets the adversary is most likely to attack. No counterintelligence enterprise can operate against all contingencies, so analysis of both risk and opportunity is essential. Moreover, if policymakers do not help design counterintelligence operations, the chances are high that these operations will create situations or introduce risks that are counterproductive for policy. For this and other reasons, any separation of counterintelligence operations from foreign and defense policymaking, as has historically been the case in the United States, should be a matter of considerable concern.
In fact, successful intelligence requires the kind of coziness that makes advocates of objectivity and independence cringe. Yet no amount of collection or aptitude for warning can make up for an inability to convey knowledge to decision makers. If policymakers or commanders don’t trust an intelligence service, that service will have little influence, and opportunities for gaining decision advantage will be lost. The trick in managing a superior intelligence service is to balance intimacy with distance; the key to disabling the adversary’s service is to destroy that balance or to undermine the managers whose job it is to sustain it.